implies, in turn, that legislation should be enacted that will allow investors to feel sufficiently comfortable to purchase tiny stakes in widely held companies.
The ramifications of the law matters thesis are not merely theoretical. Instead, governments around the world are currently strengthening regulation affecting outside investors in order to bolster equity markets. 38 For instance, tentative steps are currently being taken to improve the legal protection available to minority shareholders in countries such as Germany, 39 Italy, 40 Japan 41 and Brazil 42 and stock market reform has been launched with the same goal in East Asia. 43 At the same time,
leading academics who subscribe to the law matters thesis have been making the case for law reform to policy makers in various countries that currently have weak securities markets. 44 Since the thesis that dispersed share ownership is contingent upon laws protecting minority shareholders has powerful contemporary resonance, it is worthwhile considering its persuasiveness. One point that needs to be made is that strong corporate law is probably not a necessary condition for a corporate economy dominated by widely held companies. This is because substitutes, such as stock market listing rules and 'quality control' carried out by financial intermediaries, can provide investors with sufficient confidence to purchase tiny stakes in publicly quoted companies. Historical developments in the United Kingdom ('UK'), which has a corporate economy dominated by widely held corporations, illustrate the point. 45 Even if diffuse share ownership can become the norm in large business enterprises without strong legal protection for outside investors, the fact that law reform is being carried out with the intention of building strong equity markets leads one to wonder whether 'good' corporate law is a sufficient condition for the development of a corporate economy resembling the US model. 46 In other words, if a country's legal system closely regulates opportunistic conduct by insiders, will diffuse share ownership follow in due course? Although the law matters thesis has been characterised largely in terms of substantive corporate law, 47 the answer is not necessarily. 48 Instead, there are other variables at work.
One such variable is the size of a country's economy. All else being equal, large companies are more likely to have dispersed ownership than small firms. 49 Also, bigger nations are more likely to have sizeable business enterprises than their junior counterparts. It follows that there are limits on the extent to which share ownership dispersion will take place in small countries. Studies 459, See also Black, above n 44, 2. 47 strong equity markets can be thought of as being 'almost magical'. 52 To elaborate:
Investors pay enormous amounts of money for completely intangible rights, whose value depends entirely on the quality of information that the investors receive and on the honesty of other people, about whom the investors know almost nothing.
53
Which institutions need to be in place to supplement good corporate laws? The legal system probably needs to provide appropriate backing for the legislation governing companies. For instance, 'surface' legal reforms that create protection for investors 'on the books' seem unlikely to make much difference if enforcement by regulators is lax. 54 The effect is likely to be the same if judges are corrupt, the courts have insufficient resources to process claims in a timely fashion or the judiciary lacks sufficient expertise to understand complex self-dealing transactions. 55 Moving beyond the legal system, it will be probably be helpful if there is an active financial press that can uncover and publicise instances of self-dealing. 56 Moreover, there might well Black, above n 29, 1565. 53 Black, ibid. 54 Black, ibid, 1577, 1607; Choi, above n 51, 44, 46-7. 55 Black, above n 29, 1589; Cheffins, 'Does Law Matter?', above n 45, 15; Bebchuk and Roe, above n 50, 155; Tatiana Nenova, 'The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A CrossCountry Analysis ' (2000) forthcoming Journal of Financial Economics (manuscript on file with author) 26-7, 36, 38-9, (finding that a substantial fraction of the private benefits of control blockholders enjoy can be attributed to the quality of law enforcement). A further refinement on this point would be that outside investors benefit from a judiciary that has the discretion, and will take the initiative, to deal firmly with investor expropriation. It may be that common law judges are better positioned to act in this fashion than their civil law counterparts: La Porta et al, 'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance', above n 26, 9, 12. need to be a culture of disclosure and a norm of honest dealing among corporate insiders, financial advisers, accountants and lawyers.
57
Let us take it for granted that suitable supporting institutions are in place together with 'good' corporate law. The question posed earlier can now be asked in a somewhat different form: is the existence of this package a sufficient condition for the development of a corporate economy resembling the US model? In other words, if a country has corporate laws and related structures that permit outside investors to feel comfortable about purchasing tiny stakes in publicly quoted companies, will the Berle-Means corporation necessarily dominate? The discussion which follows suggests the answer is no. This is because an additional pivotal variable seems to be part of the equation. This is that the Berle-Means corporation needs to offer intrinsic economic advantages that will drive it to the forefront in a market economy.
IV. THE DARWINIAN UNDERCURRENT OF THE LAW MATTERS THESIS
As we have seen, the conventional wisdom has been that the The competitive fitness of the Berle-Means corporation has not been ignored entirely, however, by those who stressing the importance of corporate law. See, eg, Coffee, 'The Future as History ', above n 26, 661-3. 60 On recognition of the role of supporting institutions, see, eg, Dyck and Zingales, above n 56, 3-5, 33-5. Shleifer and Vishny, in a survey of corporate governance published in 1997, echoed much the same sentiments. They conceded that concentrated ownership may make sense under some circumstances. They implied, though, that legal protection for investors needs to be in place for a national economy to achieve its potential.
Inadequate law, according to Shleifer and Vishny, will mean that a country will be 'stuck with family and insider-dominated firms receiving little external financing'.
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In a subsequent paper written with Mike Burkart and Fausto Panunzi, Shleifer articulated the Darwinian theme much more forcefully. 63 These authors sought to explain why large family-owned firms are an enduring phenomenon around the world and said that the answer is poor legal protection for outside investors. In so doing, they explicitly addressed the competitive fitness of the Berle-Means corporation. 
V. THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH A SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
The proposition that 'the best arrangement is a widely held professionallymanaged firm' 69 cannot be accepted at face value. Instead, it must be recognised that the Berle-Means corporation has drawbacks and that alternate forms of business enterprise can possess compensating advantages. 70 The result might be that there is no meaningful correlation between ownership structure and corporate performance. 71 Alternatively, the Berle-Means corporation may have inherent advantages in some settings but constitute an inappropriate structure in others. 72 We will see shortly why it cannot be taken for granted that the widely held professionally managed firm will yield superior economic outcomes. Still, before considering these factors, there needs to be due recognition of the advantages the Berle-Means corporation does offer. This section addresses the point.
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As mentioned, a separation of ownership and control in large business enterprises can be beneficial because funding will be easier to secure. 73 The edge which the Berle-Means corporation has in this respect, however, is not simply access to large amounts of capital. Instead, there is also a climate conducive to risk-taking.
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In a company where there is dispersed share ownership, most shareholders will have only a small percentage of their personal wealth tied up in the company. By virtue of this pattern of diversification, investors will expect management to undertake projects that could threaten the firm's viability if things go awry but are worth exploiting on a risk-adjusted basis because of potentially spectacular returns. Since maintaining a control block will force the largest shareholder to be poorly diversified, the thinking is likely to be different in a firm with a concentrated ownership structure. 75 The primary blockholder, by virtue of having most everything tied up in one company, will fear financial ruin and thus will tend to discourage the pursuit of risky but potentially lucrative business opportunities. There will be, in other words, a powerful incentive to 'preserve wealth rather than create it'. While delegation of decision making to an inner circle of professional managers is sensible, the arrangement has drawbacks. 85 Assuming that the executives who work for a widely held company own only a small percentage of the equity, they will receive only a tiny fraction of the returns derived from the profit-enhancing Cheffins, 'Current Trends in Corporate Governance', above n 9, 14-15. activities they engage in on behalf of shareholders. Those in charge therefore may be tempted to use their control over corporate assets to further their own interests at the expense of those who own equity. To the extent that top managers pursue their own agenda, they impose what economists refer to as 'agency costs' on these investors.
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Still, while there is an agency cost problem in widely held companies, it is not an inherently debilitating handicap. This is because various disciplining mechanisms serve to constrain self-serving managerial behaviour. 87 One is the labour market for executives (senior managers want to run companies well to impress potential alternative employers). Another is the market for a company's products or services (executives will lose their jobs if a decline in market share is sufficiently precipitous to cause the company to fail). Also significant is the capital market (companies which want to raise money receive less advantageous terms if there is evidence of mismanagement). Moreover, there is the threat of a hostile takeover bid, which occurs when a bidder makes an offer to the shareholders of a target company to buy their equity with a view to installing new executives. Hostile takeovers are a natural consequence of the dispersed ownership structure associated with the Berle-Means corporation: a bidder can acquire control by purchasing shares on the open market rather than by negotiating with a dominant shareholder.
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In the US, hostile takeovers were primarily a 1980s phenomenon. Merger and acquisition activity continued thereafter (sometimes at a frantic pace) but the vast majority of bids were nominally 'friendly'. 89 The new trend potentially could have increased the scope for managerial slack but it is doubtful whether this occurred.
Instead, corporate governance adapted. This was because 'equilibrating devices' -agents of adaptive efficiency that force corporations to respond to a change in the
86
The leading work on agency costs is Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure ' (1976) 
VI. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND THE CASE AGAINST THE BERLE-MEANS CORPORATION
For the purposes of this paper, the elements of a Darwinian version of the law matters thesis are now in place. Essentially, the US-style public corporation derives powerful advantages through its ability to agglomerate capital and to exploit the benefits of specialisation of management and risk bearing. Still, 'it is a fragile contraption' 94 that can only achieve dominance when the law provides outside investors with sufficient legal protection to be confident about purchasing tiny stakes in large companies. Correspondingly, if a country fails to offer laws that make minority shareholders feel 'comfortable', it will be denied the economic benefits that the Berle-Means corporation can deliver. The point we take up here is the alleged competitive superiority of the widely held company. As we will see now, even if shareholders feel comfortable about owning tiny percentages of equity in publicly traded companies, this type of business enterprise may not possess inherent advantages that will guarantee dominance in a corporate economy.
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Ronald J Gilson, 'Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter? ' (1996) An important related point is that the benefits associated with superior monitoring can potentially accrue without a large sacrifice in terms of managerial sophistication. With the Berle-Means corporation, an implicit assumption typically is that the benefits to be derived from reliance on professionally trained executives are integrally related to diffuse shareholdings. This, however, does not have to be the case.
101 Take the example of a family-owned company which has grown substantially as a result of success over a period of decades. With this sort of business, the day-today operations of the company may ultimately become too complex for the head of the family to master everything. Also, as control passes from generation to generation, the heirs may not have the talent, dedication or inclination to take on a leadership role.
Under these circumstances, a potentially successful strategy for the family will be to delegate managerial prerogatives to professionally trained senior executives. 102 These individuals can then make key decisions concerning production, distribution and the long-term allocation of resources. Fund managers who make investment decisions on behalf of these institutions allegedly worry greatly about annual and even quarterly performance targets.
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Corporate executives, nervous about such potential impatience, reputedly react by making it their highest priority to produce better financial results in the present, even at the cost of sacrificing higher profits in the future. 111 Correspondingly, in order to deliver financial results that will be acceptable to the market, widely held corporations will underinvest in research and development, human capital, product development and supplier and distribution networks. With a significant number of studies, the working hypothesis was in fact the opposite. The assumption was that manager controlled firms should have been less profitable due to agency costs: Short, above n 87, 204-6. 139 Gugler, above n 98, 14.
according to a thorough survey of the topic published in 1994, '[t]he empirical research…has failed to reach any conclusions as to whether the type of ownership structure does significantly affect performance'.
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A more recent synopsis, offered in 2001, casts even more doubt on the proposition that a separation of ownership and control offers a decisive edge.
According to this survey, the 'results are ambiguous, but the preponderance of studies point to a profitability-enhancing role of owner control'. 141 Hence, while 'the sign and the magnitude of the relationship between owner control and performance is…not unambiguously answered…[t]he evidence supports the hypothesis large shareholders are active monitors in companies, and this entails beneficial effects for corporations.' 142 Overall, then, the empirical data on ownership and profitability is inconsistent with the assumptions about ownership structure that appear to underlie the Darwinian version of the law matters thesis.
Despite the empirical trends, it should not be taken for granted that the proposition that a separation of ownership and control contributes to corporate success has been refuted. Instead, it is possible that imprecise methodology has concealed the virtues of the Berle-Means corporation. For instance, with most of the empirical work that has been done, the underlying assumption has been that as shareholder concentration increases, performance improves (or declines) in a linear fashion. 143 There is some empirical evidence which suggests, however, the relationship might be "saw-toothed". 144 ' (1985) 93 Journal of Political Economy 1155. In the subsequent discussion, the ideas expressed by Demsetz and this group of co-authors are attributed to 'Demsetz et al '. a particular business enterprise. In other words, the market will bring forth ownership structures that are, at least approximately, appropriate for the companies in question. 177 Hence, the particular characteristics of a firm and its owners will dictate whether there will be a dominant blockholder or a Berle-Means corporation. 178 To illustrate, consider a corporation that is well-suited to exploit economies of scale and becomes very large. As the company grows, the price of a given fraction of the equity will increase. This higher price should, in itself, reduce the degree of ownership that is concentrated since wealth constraints will come into play. 179 Risk aversion should reinforce this effect. Investors will prefer, all else being equal, not to have all of their risk on one undertaking. The bias in favour of risk spreading should, in turn, foster dispersed ownership.
180
A countervailing factor, according to Demsetz et al, could be the nonpecuniary income associated with the ability to deploy resources to suit one's personal preferences. 181 They argue that industries which offer considerable scope to indulge such whims ('amenity potential') are ones where tight control is more likely to exist.
An example they provide is a mass media corporation, since the potential to influence public opinion could outweigh the utility associated with risk diversification.
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A corollary of this analysis of the causes of share ownership, as emphasised by Demsetz et al, is that there is no reason to expect a link between profitability and the degree of ownership dispersion. 183 Their reasoning on this point is that, regardless of the net cash flow particular firms might generate, there will be market-driven momentum in favour of whatever ownership structure is most suitable for a firm at any particular point in time. The dynamic involved will be that firms which maximise 177 Demsetz and Villalonga, above n 146, 231.
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Ibid 210, 230; Demsetz and Lehn, above n 176, 1174.
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Demsetz and Lehn, above n 176, 1158.
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Ibid.
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Ibid 1161-2; Demsetz and Villalonga, above n 146, 222-3.
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Demsetz and Villalonga, above n 146, 223; Demsetz and Lehn, above n 176, 1162. For anecdotal evidence supporting this contention, see Jackson, above n 14.
183
Demsetz and Lehn, above n 176, 1174. Note that it does not necessarily follow that mechanisms of corporate governance are irrelevant to performance. On why, see Bøhern and Ødegaard, above n 141, 7. shareholder returns via appropriate ownership structures will be able to raise capital more cheaply and thus will disproportionately tend to survive.
184
Demsetz et al acknowledge that the market in which ownership structures are formed will not be perfect.
185 Still, the momentum towards whatever format is suitable at a particular point in time will allegedly be strong enough to remove any predictable relation between profitability on the one hand and ownership diffusion (or concentration) on the other. 186 The fact that the empirical research that has been conducted does not offer definitive conclusions concerning the impact which ownership structure has on corporate performance means such reasoning can certainly not be dismissed out of hand.
187

VIII. REASSESSING THE DARWINIAN VERSION OF THE LAW MATTERS THESIS
Now that we have assessed the impact dispersed and concentrated share protection available to outside investors since this will provide a platform for the emergence of companies with diffuse share ownership. Assuming that other useful institutions associated with strong equity markets are in place, such reform will permit the Berle-Means corporation to operate on a level playing field. Since this type of business enterprise has inherent economic advantages, over time it will become a dominant feature in the corporate economy. Financial underdevelopment correspondingly will end.
As we have seen, however, the competitive superiority of the Berle-Means corporation cannot be taken for granted. Instead, there are trade-offs between diffuse and concentrated ownership which means that neither is inherently superior.
Moreover, if Demsetz et al are correct, ownership structure may be irrelevant to corporate performance. What ramifications do these insights have for the law matters thesis?
Let us consider first the position if Demsetz et al are right. They say that the particular characteristics of a firm and its owners will dictate whether share ownership is concentrated or diffuse. Moreover, the outcome will not have any impact on firm profitability. What does this mean for a country that has traditionally offered weak protection to outside investors but is now introducing reforms that constrain significantly mistreatment of minority shareholders? Two results can be expected to follow, one which will be consistent with the Darwinian version of the law matters thesis, and one which will not.
The result that will be consistent with the law matters thesis is that diffuse ownership will become more common. What should happen is that legal reform will change the returns that dominant shareholders will receive, and will do so in a way that causes at least some control blocks to unravel. To illustrate, assume that ABC Co is a publicly quoted company with 100 shares that operates in a country where, at least initially, legal protection offered to minority shareholders is weak. The figures are borrowed, with various adaptations, from Bebchuk and Roe, above n 50, constitutes what is known as a control premium, with at least part of this reflecting the private benefits of control the dominant faction can extract at the expense of outside investors.
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Assume now that the country where ABC Co is based enacts new laws that enhance the protection available to minority shareholders. Since the controllers will have less scope to use their position to extract rents, the value of their shares falls to $55, or $1.10 per share. 192 The total value of ABC Co would remain $100, however,
given that Demsetz et al say ownership structure is irrelevant to corporate performance. The outsiders' shares will therefore be worth $45, or $0.90 per share.
The controlling faction, under such circumstances, may well calculate that since control offers such a tiny premium, it is time to obtain the benefits of liquidity and risk-spreading by unwinding the control block. The end result will be that ABC Co will still be worth $100 but outsiders will own all of the 100 shares, each with a value of $1.
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Extrapolating from this example, the analysis Demsetz et al offers implies that strengthening the legal protection offered to minority shareholders should cause some dispersion of share ownership. Vindication, then, for the law matters thesis? Not in its Darwinian form. This is because in a crucial respect the status quo would prevail: the value generated by the corporate economy would be unaffected. Again, the Darwinian version of the law matters thesis presumes that countries where blockholders dominate suffer from financial underdevelopment. Law reform is prescribed as the
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Although the figures chosen here are arbitrary, empirical studies suggest that the premium attached to controlling shares exceeds 25 per cent of equity value in a significant number of countries: Nenova, above n 55, 32, 38; Dyck and Zingales, above n 56, 14.
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On the contribution which extracting private value makes to the control premium, see Roe, 'Political Preconditions', above n 27, 595; Dyck and Zingales, above n 56, [6] [7] While the number selected again is arbitrary, the choice is not unrealistic. According to some cross-border research, more than 70 per cent of the difference in private benefits of control can be explained by the nature of the legal rights outside investors enjoy: Nenova, above n 55, 38-9. Other cross-border empirical work suggests that legal variables are important, but not on this order of magnitude: Dyck and Zingales, above n 56, 35. 193 A pro rata valuation of $1 per share is appropriate because each would benefit from a control premium reflecting the fact that there are votes attached to the equity. On this, see Nenova, above n 55, 6. cure, with the anticipated result being better overall corporate performance. If Demsetz et al are correct, no such result should be anticipated. Again, the assumption that is made from this camp is that changes to ownership structure will not deliver stronger performance. By extension, a shift towards diffuse ownership that is prompted by law reform will not yield a better outcome for the corporate economy.
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Let us set aside now the position advocated by Demsetz et al and assume that the manner in which share ownership is configured can have an impact on how companies perform. This opens the possibility that a country which experiences a shift from concentrated to dispersed ownership will, consistent with the Darwinian version of the law matters thesis, benefit economically. Our analysis of the impact that ownership structure is likely to have on corporate performance suggests, however, that this outcome cannot be taken for granted.
Again, the empirical research that has been done has failed to generate any firm conclusions on the contribution ownership structure makes to corporate profitability. 195 For law matters advocates who assume that the introduction of reforms designed to protect outside investors will yield beneficial economic outcomes, this poses a problem. Such changes to the law may provide a suitable institutional platform for increased ownership dispersion. Still, since diffuse share ownership may not offer inherent economic advantages, it cannot be taken for granted that the Berle-Means corporation will in fact move to the forefront. Correspondingly, there will not be any cure for whatever financial underdevelopment might exist.
This prognosis may, however, not capture the full story. Instead, due account should be taken of the fact that there may be circumstances where dispersed ownership might offer advantages. For instance, it may be that companies with diffuse share ownership will tend to outperform companies with a second or third-generation family blockholder. 196 At the same time, the properties associated with strong equity markets may mean the Berle-Means corporation has the edge in those industries 194 But see Demsetz, above n 128, 383 (arguing that allowing for fractional ownership makes investment funds available at lower costs to society). Companies with a second or third-generation family blockholder will, despite performing at a sub-optimal level, remain entrenched. Also, the fact that dispersed share ownership is not an option means that the country's ability to compete will be impaired when economies of scale or innovative capacity matter.
In the foregoing scenario, a story closely related to the Darwinian version of the law matters thesis can be told. If the country in question enacts laws that protect minority shareholders and fosters the development of supporting institutions, then it will become feasible for corporations with diffuse ownership to play a significant role.
This means that, in companies which might otherwise suffer a penalty by virtue of having heirs in control, the unwinding of the potentially counterproductive control block could occur readily. 198 The same process might well occur when there are extra profits to be derived by developing economies of scale or by exploiting innovative technology. The upshot would be that in various contexts where a separation of ownership and control can be beneficial, law reform would permit the inherent advantages of the Berle-Means corporation to come into play.
Note that under these circumstances, the corporate economy would not be transformed in a wholesale fashion. Still, where diffuse share ownership offers an 197 See above nn 172-5 and accompanying text.
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To illustrate using the ABC Co example set out above, the value of the company might be $100 with a family blockholder owning 50 shares and $150 with completely dispersed ownership. Again, before legal reform, the family's block of shares is worth $70 (see above n 189 and text following). If legal reform completely eliminated any control premium, this block could still be sold for $75, a profit of $5. The change to the law should correspondingly be sufficient to induce structural transformation. It cannot be taken for granted, however, that a switch from concentrated to diffuse ownership will be on the cards where a company is worth more with dispersed share ownership. On this, see Bebchuk and Roe, above n 50, On the outcome where a company is worth less with dispersed ownership, see Roe, 'Political Preconditions', above n 27, edge, a reconfiguration will take place based on the basis of competitive fitness. The ultimate result should be improved performance throughout the corporate sector, with attendant beneficial spin-offs for the economy at large.
We have now a reconfigured Darwinian version of the law matters that takes due account of the costs and benefits of the separation of ownership and control.
Essentially, the story that can be told is that increasing the legal protection available to outside investors will constitute a useful addition to the 'organizational toolkit '. 199 The fact that it will be feasible for a separation of ownership and control to emerge readily will not mean that the Berle-Means corporation will become inherently dominant. Instead, a reconfiguration of ownership structures can be anticipated in certain sectors of the corporate economy, with beneficial results.
Still, we cannot quite end matters at this point. Instead, two caveats need to be made. One concerns the political milieu within which companies operate. Our discussion of the trade-offs between dispersed and concentrated ownership was implicitly premised on the idea that all firms within a country will encounter a level playing field in their dealings with the state. This assumption may not, however, be realistic. Instead, the possibility exists that companies with blockholders might have advantages in the political arena that could give them a decisive edge when diffuse ownership otherwise might be advantageous. 200 The key variable in this instance is that individuals owning large blocks of shares will be ideally situated to foster enduring personal links with politicians and bureaucrats and thereby secure subsidies that are unavailable to other firms. 201 To the extent that reciprocity between public officials and blockholders does affect market outcomes within a country, reforms that 199 strengthen protections made available to outside investors may fail to yield the hypothesised beneficial reconfiguration in ownership structures.
Fears about the detrimental impact of the 'crony capitalism' just described 202 should not be overstated, however, in this instance. Again, the country under consideration will have enacted laws that erode the private benefits of control. A reasonable assumption to make is that blockholders, being aware of the implications, will have used their political connections to lobby against such changes. 203 Reform, however, will have occurred regardless. 204 A fair inference to draw, therefore, might be that controlling factions within the country in question lack the political clout to ensure that their companies secure special favours from politicians and bureaucrats.
Still, the experience in Canada, where minority shareholders are well protected and wealthy families retain at least some influence over public officials, 205 suggests that it is imprudent to remove politics from the equation too readily.
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The second caveat that must be borne in mind with respect to the revised 207 202 To the extent that dominant shareholder factions might be an asset in various circumstances, it should be beneficial for a country to offer a regulatory environment which allows scope for large blocks of shares to play a significant role. This will be a familiar refrain to those who have been following the debates concerning comparative corporate governance since the early 1990s. At that point in time, Germany and Japan seemed to be enjoying greater economic success than the US. 208 The promise of the German and Japanese systems, to some American eyes, was that they offered the benefits of 'dedicated capital' exemplified by close and active monitoring of management via shareholder coalitions and supervision by banks. 209 A popular belief was that American companies were potentially disadvantaged because legal regulation forced US shareholders to remain diffuse and passive. The policy prescription that followed was that the US should offer a hospitable legal environment for blockholder governance.
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Those advocating reform did not necessarily want America to foster actively concentrated share ownership. 211 Instead, there was a potentially attractive middle ground: offer scope for variation and foster competition between organisational forms. 212 To quote Edward Rock, a US law professor:
If different governance structures are possible, and if different structures have different advantages and disadvantages in different contexts, then why not let them compete within the U.S. system, and not just in the competition between the United States and Germany and the United States and Japan?
Now that we have taken into account the potential attractions associated with offering a hospitable environment for a full range of ownership structures, let us return to the caveat about beneficial control blocks we are considering. As Professor
Rock has acknowledged, there may be limits on the extent to which a country's legal system can foster competition between different ownership structures. 214 For present purposes, what matters is that following the policy prescription implied by the law matters thesis -promoting the rights of outside investors -may undercut the feasibility of blockholder governance.
Colin Mayer, an economist, has made just this argument with respect to the UK, stating that 'the promotion of stock-markets and minority interests may have had a serious cost in discouraging the close involvement of insider groups in corporate activities.' 215 Mayer cites the enactment of legislation prohibiting insider dealing, arguing that such regulations may hinder blockholding because of a fear of the consequences of being a party to privileged information. 216 He also mentions rules enforced by the Takeover Panel, a 'referee' for takeover offers involving UK public companies, that require a shareholder which accumulates a large stake in a quoted company to make a full bid for all of the shares.
217
Let us draw together our reassessment of the Darwinian version of the law matters thesis. Once the costs and benefits of dispersed ownership are taken into account, a potentially appealing way of thinking about the law matters thesis is to assume that enactment of laws protecting minority shareholders will foster beneficial 214 competition between organisational forms within a corporate economy. 218 Still, creating a hospitable environment for dispersed share ownership may discourage the close involvement of insider groups in corporate governance. Since, at least under some circumstances, blockholders can make a positive contribution to corporate performance, a country that strongly promotes the interests of minority shareholders could suffer some adverse economic consequences.
219
IX. CONCLUSION
At present, a popular thesis is that the 'law matters' in the sense that the quality of legal protection offered to minority shareholders helps to determine patterns of ownership and control. To the extent that this is correct, countries which ignore the interests of minority shareholders are unlikely to have strong equity markets or more than a tiny handful of companies with diffuse share ownership. The result, according to at least some advocates of the law matters thesis, is that these countries will suffer financial underdevelopment. This is because, under optimal conditions, the best arrangement for corporate enterprise is a widely held professionally managed firm.
What follows is a strong message for policy makers: recognise the Darwinian implications of minority shareholder protection (or lack thereof). To be more precise, a country must provide a hospitable environment for outside investors so the BerleMeans corporation can exploit its natural advantages or adverse economic consequences will follow. This paper has subjected to critical scrutiny the inferences that can and should be drawn from the law matters thesis. We have seen that while a separation of ownership and control does have positive features, the agency cost problem constitutes a serious potential drawback. Moreover, companies which have a dominant blockholder are perhaps better able to develop a valuable corporate architecture than their widely held counterparts. Given such dynamics, it should probably not be surprising that empirical research which has been conducted does not 218 Roe, 'The Quality of Corporate Law Argument', above n 31, 11. 219 Porter, above n 110, 76, 82; Bhide, above n 119, 138-9; Mayer, 'Stock-Markets', above n 169, 193. offer a definitive verdict on the extent to which ownership structure affects corporate performance.
Once it is recognised that the trade-offs between diffuse and concentrated ownership mean it cannot be taken for granted that the Berle-Means corporation is inherently superior, the Darwinian inferences that can be drawn from the law matters thesis need to be recast. If, as some have argued, ownership structure is irrelevant to corporate performance, strengthening minority shareholder protection could yield more diffuse share ownership without yielding a beneficial economic outcome. On the other hand, the manner in which share ownership is configured may influence the results companies deliver under a range of circumstances, including where control is on the verge of being transferred to heirs or where innovative capacity is pivotal. If this is right, countries which offer a suitable platform for dispersed share ownership may reap dividends because the Berle-Means corporation will move to the forefront in certain sectors of the economy. Increasing the legal protection available to outside investors will therefore constitute a potentially useful addition to the 'organizational toolkit'. Even here, however, there are dangers, since laws that protect outside investors could deter potentially beneficial blockholding. In sum, while the law matters thesis seems to offer a clear and urgent message for policy makers, the practical realities of corporate ownership structure mean that the true situation is considerably more complex.
